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NOTE
YOU CAN'T CHOOSE YOUR PARENTS: WHY
CHILDREN RAISED BY SAME-SEX COUPLES ARE
ENTITLED TO INHERITANCE RIGHTS FROM
BOTH THEIR PARENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a bright eleven-year-old girl, Erin, who has recently lost
her mother, Jane, in a car accident. Jane was only forty-two years old
and she died without a will.' Normally this would entitle someone like
Erin to receive proceeds from Jane's estate. However, in this case, the
court held she was left with nothing.2 This inequity occurs because Jane
was not Erin's biological mother; she was instead the life partner of
Erin's natural mother, Carol. Carol and Jane were in a committed
relationship for twenty years, and together they made the decision to
parent a child. Jane was there for Carol's artificial insemination,
throughout the pregnancy, and acted as Erin's parent since her birth. The
fact that Jane raised Erin for eleven years and maintained a close parentchild relationship with her is simply not enough for Erin to inherit from
Jane's estate. As the law stands, the only people entitled to inherit
intestate from Jane are her heirs, and as the state does not recognize Erin
(or Carol) as such, Erin is left to mourn her loss without any financial
support. Jane's only heirs may be cousins or other relatives with no
substantial relationship or connection with Jane and yet as the law stands
they are entitled to everything.
Children born to same-sex parents should not suffer legal
disadvantages simply because society may not approve of their parents'
way of life. To withhold this benefit and protection from these children
leaves them in a vulnerable and unjust position. Further, it violates their
constitutional rights. Because a child has no control over who his or her
1. She never made a will; this is unfortunately very common in the United States. See infra

notes 27-29.
2. Note that this is only a hypothetical case.
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parents are, denying these children equal inheritance rights violates the
Constitution. It is now an accepted notion that non-marital children
cannot be denied inheritance from either of their parents,3 and since
children of same-sex parents are similarly situated, denying them the
right to inherit from both parents is unconstitutional.
This Note will focus on the inheritance rights of children of samesex parents and why there is need for recognition of these rights. It calls
for a statutory response, expanding the legislation that addresses the
inheritance rights of non-marital children. The proposal incorporates
aspects of the equitable parent, equitable adoption and de facto parent
theories, thereby emphasizing the quality and nature of the parent-child
relationship and not simply the biological or current legal relationship.
Enactment of the statute called for would allow a child lacking a genetic
connection to a parent to receive the recovery that was intended for her.
With such changes, states would avoid violating the constitutional rights
of these children, and be able to set guidelines and requirements for the
courts to follow when examining the rights to recovery.
Part II describes the state of inheritance laws for children of samesex parents and the options that are currently available for these parents
and children to use in an attempt to gain inheritance rights. Part II also
articulates some of the alternative common law theories, such as de facto
parent and equitable adoption, which have been asserted in support of
acknowledging non-traditional parent-child relationships. But, these
theories are not the best option for these children and their parents. Not
only do they require the time and expense of litigation, but also they are
decided on a case-by-case basis, and while they have been somewhat
successful for custody and visitation proceedings, they have not proved
significant for inheritance purposes.
Part III presents a constitutional analysis that addresses the
evolution of inheritance rights for out-of-wedlock children and compares
them to children of same-sex parents. It argues that excluding children of
same-sex parents from inheritance violates their equal protection rights
in the same way that it violates the rights of children born out of
wedlock who were denied two lines of inheritance.
Part IV offers a suggestion for state legislatures on how to meet the
constitutional needs of children of same-sex parents by allowing them to
inherit from both their parents. A state should amend its inheritance

3. In Trimble v. Gordon, the Supreme Court held that to deny children of non-marital parents
the right to recover intestate from both parents violated their equal protection rights. 430 U.S. 762,
776 (1977).
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statutes, which are applicable to non-marital children, or create new
statutes that incorporate some of the components of the alternative
theories discussed in Part II. In so doing, each state can still determine
the level of proof that will be necessary to demonstrate that a parentchild relationship worthy of intestate recognition exists. By expanding
the current laws, children of same-sex parents can provide sufficient
evidence of such a relationship, which will in turn allow them to recover
from the estate of their non-biological parent. This proposal will allow
the child to obtain inheritance rights without granting the other parent
any additional rights, such as inheritance or benefits relating to the death
of his or her partner. Therefore, this statute should be enacted whether or
not the state chooses to recognize domestic partnerships or same-sex
marriages. If the legislatures refuse to take this initiative, then the courts
should intervene and declare the current statutes unconstitutional on
equal protection grounds.
II.

PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

A. The Facts and Why There Is a Problem
When an individual dies without a will, "an intestate statute
provides an 'estate plan' designed by the state legislature. 'A This is
essentially a default doctrine 5 planned by the state to distribute the assets
of someone who dies without any formal writing directing how his or
her estate should be divided.6 When there is no will 7 available, the state
usually requires that the estate be distributed to the decedent's spouse,
and then other blood relatives.8 Unless there is a formal adoption, the
other partner is a legal stranger to the child and the child has no right to
inherit from the nonbiological parent. 9 In most cases, children are
entitled to inherit intestate from their natural or biological parents or
their adoptive parents.' 0 While the general rule is that children can have

ROGER W. ANDERSEN, UNDERSTANDING TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 3, at 13 (3d ed. 2003).
5. Id.
6. See JOEL C. DOBRIS ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 62 (2d ed.
2003).
7. A will is a "document by which a person directs his or her estate to be distributed upon
death." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1628 (8th ed. 2004).
8. See Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 2

4.

(2000).
9. JOAN M. BURDA, ESTATE PLANNING FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES 63,69 (2004).
10. See Gary, supra note 8, at 2; see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114,8 U.L.A. 91 (1998).
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only two legal parents," determining who can recover intestate from a
decedent is a power delegated to the states,' 2 and the procedure followed
differs from state to state. However, states are reluctant to grant
inheritance rights to a child of someone who is not a legal parent.' 3 And,
to
as the law stands, the ability to
4 become a legal parent is limited
biological and adoptive parents.'
This is a problem for children being raised by homosexual parents,
and this type of family is becoming more prevalent across the country,
not just in states that have granted rights to these couples or have
illustrated some level of acceptance. In fact, with the experience of the
"gayby" boom in the 1990s, the number of lesbian and gay parents in
this country increased dramatically.' 5 It seems probable that most of
these parents would expect their children to recover from their estates,16
and be afforded both the psychological and financial protection 7 that
would accompany the recognition of these non-traditional families.'
11. See Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996
UTAH L. REV. 93, 99 n.8.
12.

See RALPH C. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY 4 (2004).

13. This is because the "[l]egislatures have been reluctant to expand the definition of family
for purposes of intestacy." Gary, supranote 8, at 4.
14. See id. at 40-41. Black's Law Dictionarydefines legal parent as:
The lawful father or mother of someone. In ordinary usage, the term denotes more than
responsibility for conception and birth. The term commonly includes (1) either the
natural father or the natural mother of a child, (2) the adoptive father or adoptive mother
of a child, (3) a child's putative blood parent who has expressly acknowledged paternity,
and (4) an individual or agency whose status as guardian has been established by judicial
decree. In law, parental status based on any criterion may be terminated by judicial
decree. In other words, a person ceases to be a legal parent if that person's status as a
parent has been terminated in a legal proceeding.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004).

15. BURDA, supra note 9, at 63. The exact numbers vary but "[t]he American Bar
Association's Family Law Section estimates that four million lesbian or gay parents are raising
eight million to ten million children." Id. The Lambda Legal Defense Fund puts the number at six to
ten million homosexual parents raising six to fourteen million children. Id. "[T]he May 2000 edition
of Demography... states that 21.6[%] of lesbian homes and 5.2[%] of gay male homes include
children." Id. And, the 2000 Census estimates that 33% of same-sex female partners and 22% of gay
male partners are raising children. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MARRIED-COUPLE AND UNMARRIEDat
available
(2003),
10
at
2000,
HOUSEHOLDS:
PARTNER
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-5.pdf.
16. But see Lynn Waddell, Gays in FloridaSeek Adoption Alternatives, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
2005, at A20. Those who recognize the legal restrictions on their children's rights are concerned.
For example, a Tampa accountant, Cathy James, is the breadwinner in her relationship and her
partner is a stay at home mom. She worries that if something should happen to her, the four-year-old
son that she and her partner are raising together would not be entitled to her inheritance or social
security benefits and thus would suffer substantially in terms of his financial needs. Id.
17. See Gary, supra note 8, at 57 (discussing how intestacy laws have adapted in response to
changes within society, such as with regard to adoption and the status of illegitimate children).
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Intestate laws are designed (in theory) to reflect the presumed
desires of the decedent, so that the estate is distributed according to what
is assumed to be the individual's intention. A primary objective is to
protect dependent family members.18 Of course, this suggests an
incongruity when the wishes of the decedent and the dependent children
are not covered in the state inheritance statutes. Therefore, current laws
need to adapt to meet these changing desires. The Uniform Probate
Code, a model statute, suggests policy for the states to adopt, and
provides: "Any part of a decedent's estate not effectively disposed of by
will passes ...to the decedent's heirs ... ,,"19 The Code further requires
that a relationship of a parent and child must be established to determine
succession. It proposes that an adopted person is the child of an adopting
parent and not the natural parents, except in cases concerning a spouse
of a natural parent.2 ° It further states that a person is the child of his or
her parents regardless of the marital status of the parents, 2 a concept
advocated by the Uniform Parentage Act.22
While the Code has expanded to address some non-traditional
families, it does not offer an opportunity for the children of same-sex
partners to whom the child is not biologically tied, or legally tied
through the means of a lawful adoption, a chance to recover from this
parent's estate. This in turn leaves such a child without inheritance rights
should the non-legal parent die intestate.
Some may argue that since children cannot be born to one parent
alone, there must be another biological parent from whom they can
recover. In this sense, the child is still entitled to recover from two
separate lines and is thus not denied equal protection of the laws.
However, this straightforward two-parent logic has become outdated
with the increase of artificial insemination and sperm or egg donations.2 3
Therefore, it is neither unreasonable nor impossible for the statutes governing inheritance to forego
another transformation to better meet the realities of current families.
18. ANDERSEN, supra note 4, § 3, at 13-14.
19.

UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101, 8 U.L.A. 79 (1998).

20. Id. § 2-114(b), 8 U.L.A. at 91 ("An adopted individual is the child of his [or her] adopting
parent or parents and not of his [or her] natural parents, but adoption of a child by the spouse of
either natural parent has no effect on (i) the relationship between the child and that natural parent or
(ii) the right of the child or a descendant of the child to inherit from or through the other natural
parent.").
21. Id. § 2-114, 8 U.L.A. 91 cmt. (1998).
22. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 202, 9B U.L.A. 309 (2001).
23. The precise number of births through artificial insemination is difficult to ascertain;
however by the 1990s, the number of births from artificial insemination by donor (i.e., by a donor
other than the woman's husband) was estimated at nearly 30,000 per year, and at the end of the
twentieth century, it was suggested that 60,000 births occurred each year in the United States
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In addition, the extent to which a child may inherit, 24 the sources from
whom he or she may inherit, is determined by the state, and therefore
can vary state by state.25 In other cases, a child may in fact have a second
biological parent, perhaps due to a past relationship, but the child might
have no contact with this parent, or the rights of this parent may have
been relinquished or terminated, which again leaves the child at a
disadvantage. 26 It is shameful that these children are placed in an

unequal and disadvantageous position, where it is impossible to recover
inheritance from two parents, since this is a right that is granted to
children of heterosexual parents.
Another argument that could be made is that all the non-biological
parent need do is to execute a will in which the child is provided for to
receive the protection being advocated.27 Wills do not, however, provide
full protection for the inheritance rights of same-sex couples. "Most
Americans die without wills. '' 28 There are many explanations for why
this happens. First, executing a will is an emotional and financial burden.
because of donor insemination. BRASHIER, supra note 12, at 170. In the vast majority of these cases,
a donor waives their right to any children subsequently born, by signing a contract. See id. at 172
(asserting that "[s]tatutes governing artificial insemination may provide generally that the donor is
not the father of the child," and that in cases of anonymous donation, "courts have protected the
apparent intentions of the parties" by finding the "donor has no rights or responsibilities to the
resulting child"); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106(2) (West 2003); In re Guardianship
of I.H., 834 A.2d 922, 927 (Me. 2003) (holding in part that an anonymous sperm donor was not
entitled to notice of petition for guardianship); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702, 9B U.L.A. 355
(2001).
24. See, e.g., In re Wagner, 748 P.2d 639, 641 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that the
inheritance rights of an adopted child, for example, are determined by the law of the state in which
the property is located).
25. See, e.g., ANDERSEN, supra note 4, § 5[A][2], at 21 (explaining that states differ in how
they afford inheritance rights to adopted children); see also ALA. CODE § 43-8-48 (1991) (providing
that a child is considered the child of adopted parents only and has no inheritance rights through
natural parents after such adoption); cf ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-109 (1998) ("An
adopted person is the child of an adopting parent and not of the natural parents except that an
adopted child inherits from the natural parents and their respective kin if the adoption decree so
provides ...").
26. In cases where a second biological parent is involved, albeit to a minor degree, the partner
could be examined under the same rationale as step-parents. As this last category seems to lack the
urgency of the other ones, it is not the scenario that brings about the most concern. It can be argued
that these children are provided with equal rights and if the biological parent's partner intends for
them to inherit, he or she may have to provide for them in a written will.
27. Executing a will to provide for loved ones is sound logic, as all competent adults are
encouraged to make a will to ensure their property and wealth passes to those whom they wish to
receive it, and also to exercise the ability to delegate shares and specific items if so desired.
However, many adults, homosexual and heterosexual alike, fail to draft legally binding wills, for
whatever reason. See Gary, supra note 8, at 15. ("Surveys consistently show that many Americans
die without wills.").
28. DOBRIS ET AL., supra note 6, at 62.
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Also, many people are reluctant to consider death and therefore will put
off the actual drafting of a will. 29 Additionally, many people distrust
lawyers, and for homosexual couples, there likely exists an additional
hesitance to explain their relationship to a lawyer, especially in a
conservative community. 30 Furthermore, even if a facially valid will has
been executed, there is still concern that the default rules of intestate
succession will govern the distribution of property. Blood relatives may
contest the validity of the will using theories of fraud, incapacity or
undue influence. 31 And since the interpretation of validity is a jury
question, individual prejudices may triumph, or a surviving partner and
child may instead agree to forego the trial and settle with the family out
of court, ultimately resulting in a loss as well.32
Since the law has not yet adapted to provide for such children, not
only with regard to inheritance, but also in the areas of support,
visitation, custody and other related family matters, these children are
denied assistance for no reason aside from their parents' status. 33 The
responses to this problem have taken many forms. Some advocate for

29. It is estimated that seven out often Americans die without a will. Grace Weinstein, Where
There's a Will, There Are Mistakes, Bus. WK., Jan. 8, 1996, at I14E-2. And among adults over age
fifty, only sixty percent have a will. AARP RESEARCH GROUP, WHERE THERE IS A WILL ... LEGAL
DOCUMENTS AMONG THE 50+ POPULATION: FINDINGS FROM AN AARP SURVEY 1 (2000), available
at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/econ/will.pdf.
30. BRASHIER, supra note 12, at 70-71 (stating that "many homosexuals in committed
relationships ... die intestate" and suggesting that, with respect to unmarried couples generally,
there may be hesitation about revealing confidential information to a lawyer in a conservative
community). It follows that if even heterosexual unmarried partners should feel hesitant to disclose
their testamentary desires to a lawyer, homosexual partners would also share these fears. But see
Gary, supra note 8, at 18-19 (suggesting an additional reason for the general failure to make a will
was limited actual knowledge of the intestate scheme, and citing a survey conducted by the
American Bar Association indicating that 63.6% of those without wills cited laziness as the primary
explanation).
31. BRASHIER, supra note 12, at 71-72; see also Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of
Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199, 210 (2001).
32. BRASHIER, supra note 12, at 72; see also BURDA, supra note 9, at 21 ("Estranged family
members often rise up like a tsunami wave to claim their 'right' to the property of their lesbian or
gay relative .... [They] challeng[e] any document,... deny[ing] that the decedent was gay
and... deny[ing] there was an intimate relationship between the decedent and the surviving partner.
These arguments find a sympathetic ear from a judge who shares the family's distaste for same-sex
relationships.").
33. See, e.g., Tiffany L. Palmer, Family Matters: Establishing Legal Parental Rights for
Same-Sex Parents and Their Children, HUM. RTS., Summer 2003, at 9 ("Without a legal
relationship with the second parent, a child has no right of financial support or inheritance from the
nonlegal parent and cannot receive social security, retirement, or state workers' compensation
benefits ...").
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legal recognition of the parents' relationship,34 others suggest secondparent adoptions are the best way to secure rights for the children
involved, 35 and still others propose functional definitions of the parentchild relationship.36 Each of these suggestions holds merit and will be
analyzed in turn, but this Note suggests that while each proposal has its
strengths, the best method is to leave the decision to individual state
legislatures and allow the states to amend their statutes in a way that
does not explicitly provide that children of same-sex parents can inherit
from the parent's estate, but allows this to occur nonetheless.
B.

What Can Same-Sex ParentsDo Now?

The options presently available for these non-traditional families,
outside of drafting a will, are inadequate and insufficient. Civil unions or
domestic partnerships, as well as formal adoptions, are offered only in
limited jurisdictions, and reliance on theories of contract law, such as coparenting agreements or equitable adoption, can later be disputed.
Overall, there are few legal ways that same-sex parents can ensure their
child will receive the rights examined here, and the scope of the options
is relatively limited.
1. Marriage, Domestic Partnerships, and Civil Unions
The parents of these children could theoretically move to one of the
few states that allow them to enter into a civil union or a domestic
34. They may advocate either for full-fledged marriage or an alternative, such as a civil union
or domestic partnership. For an interesting discussion about the shifting views in reaction to some
changes in this area of the law and the limitations of marriage and civil unions as far as same-sex
couples are concerned, see Paula L. Ettelbrick, Speech, Domestic Partnership,Civil Unions, or
Marriage: One Size Does Not FitAll, 64 ALB. L. REV. 905 (2001).
35. For a discussion of the pros and cons of second-parent adoptions, see Erin J. Law,
Comment, Taking a CriticalLook at Second ParentAdoption, 8 LAW & SEXUALITY 699 (1998).
36. See, e.g., Gary, supra note 8, at 81-82 (proposing a statute that adds a functional definition
and includes an evidentiary presumption that such a relationship existed); see also Jennifer R.
Boone Hargis, Note, Solving Injustice in Inheritance Laws Through Judicial Discretion: Common
Sense Solutionsfrom Common Law Tradition, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 447, 466 (2003)
(discussing the need for judicial discretion and suggesting that courts should also consider the
present and future financial needs of the applicant, the applicant's present and future resources and
capacity, and the nature of the estate); cf Foster, supra note 31, at 231-33 (agreeing with the flaws
in current American inheritance law, but suggesting that the functional approach discussed by
Professor Gary, as well as the formal approach and decedent-controlled approach "share a common
limitation" because "[tihey continue to use 'family' as their point of reference"). See generally E.
Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-factor Approach to Intestate Inheritance Rights for Unmarried
Committed Partners, 81 OR. L. REv. 255 (2002) (discussing survivorship rights of a committed
partner, and calling for an accrual and multi-factor approach derived from Article II of the Uniform
Probate Code and influenced by the duration of the relationship).
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partnership, would grant inheritance rights to them. This may or may not
be an effective route for the child. It would seem logical that if these
states grant intestate rights to the partner, the child would be entitled to
these rights as well, but it is possible that, unless these rights are
explicitly provided for, a court could choose to deny them to the child."
Currently only seven states and the District of Columbia legally
recognize homosexual couples. 38 And while there may be hope that more
states will follow suit, there actually seems to be a growing resistance to
such recognition by many individuals, as well as many states, especially
following the Goodridge v. Department of Public Health decision,
which held that to deny the right of marriage to same-sex couples
violated the Massachusetts Constitution.39 In fact, eighteen states have
already enacted constitutional amendments against same-sex marriage,

37. Right now marriage is the only clear partnership that grants children the same inheritance
rights as children of opposite-sex couples. But Massachusetts is the only state that explicitly offers
this option, Jana Singer, Marriage,Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the Marital
Presumption, 65 MD. L. REv. 246, 246 n.2 (2006) (citing Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)), and while many homosexual partners have traveled to Canada to obtain
marriage licenses, their home states may not recognize the rights granted in Canada. See, e.g., Jay
Weiser, Foreword: The Next Normal-Developments Since Marriage Rights for Same-Sex Couples
in New York, 13 COLUM. J.GENDER & L. 48, 63-64 (2004) (discussing the mini-DOMAs, state
laws modeled after the federal Defense of Marriage Act, which sometimes bar recognition of samesex marriages or same-sex relationships).
38. See Enrique A. Monagas, California'sAssembly Bill 205, The Domestic PartnerRights
and ResponsibilitiesAct of 2003: Is Domestic PartnerLegislation Compromising the Campaignfor
Marriage Equality?, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 43 (2006). Massachusetts, through the courts,
recently decided that to deny the right of marriage to same-sex couples violated the Massachusetts
Constitution. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969. Since homosexuals are granted the right to marry
in Massachusetts, same-sex partners should be able to claim rights under the step-parent exception,
without resorting to second-parent adoptions. In addition, even without evidence of a biological
relationship, it is likely that because of the marriage, these children will be able to meet the current
requirements of proof for intestate succession. In October 2006, the New Jersey Supreme Court
ruled that same-sex couples are entitled to the same state rights, benefits and obligations as
opposite-sex couples. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 220-21 (N.J. 2006). Vermont has legalized
same-sex civil unions and Connecticut recently started to allow homosexuals to enter into civil
unions as well. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201(2), 1202 (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b38aa, 6b-38bb (West Supp. 2006). The California legislature also recently legalized same-sex
marriage; however, the governor quickly vetoed the new law, claiming the statute was
unconstitutional, and thus this was an area for the courts, not the legislature, to address. See Dean E.
Murphy, Schwarzenegger to Veto Same-Sex Marriage Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, at A18.
However, California does allow domestic partnerships, as does the District of Columbia and
Hawaii. CAL. FAM. CODE §297 (West 2004); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-701(3)-(4), 32-702
(LexisNexis 2006); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-2, 572C-4 (Supp. 2005).
39. 798 N.E.2d at 941; Lynn D. Wardle, The "End" of Marriage,44 FAM. CT. REV. 45, 50
(2006).
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and other states are considering similar amendments. 40 As for the states
that do provide some protection to homosexual couples, each form of
domestic partnership is different depending on the state, so the rights
granted vary as well. For example, under California's form of domestic
partnership, a same-sex couple is entitled to "equivalent rights for
4
property, children, government benefits, and arrangements after death,", 1
but Hawaii's reciprocal beneficiary relationship, while granting the
surviving partner intestate succession rights, does not confer the same
status upon the children; 42 thus, such children would still have just one
legal parent. Vermont's civil union, on the other hand, is a more
complete alternative because it incorporates most of the concepts of
traditional marriage and places it in a new legal structure.43 There has
also been a recent and interesting development in this area of the law in
New Jersey. In October of 2006, the state supreme court, while finding
no fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry, held there is a
constitutional right to receive the same state benefits, protections, and
obligations that heterosexual married couples receive. 44 The court left
the remedy up to the legislature, deciding to rule only on the
constitutional issues and therefore allowing the legislature to either
amend the current marriage statutes to include same-sex couples, or to
create a statutory scheme, such as a civil union, in a manner similar to
that of Connecticut or Vermont.45
2. Adoption as a Means of Legitimacy
In some states adoption is a viable option. One way to form a legal
parent-child relationship is through the use of "traditional adoptions, in
which a lesbian or gay person adopts a foster child or a child whom the

40. R. Stephen Painter, Jr., Reserving the Right: Does a Constitutional MarriageAmendment
Necessarily Trump an Earlier and More General Equal Protection or Privacy Provision?, 36

SETON HALL L. REV. 125, 126 (2005).
41. Weiser, supra note 37, at 61; see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West Supp. 2006).
42. Gary, supra note 8, at 36-37; see also HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-2, 572C-4 (Supp. 2005).
43. Weiser, supra note 37, at 62; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2002).
44. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 220-21 (2006). The New Jersey statute at the time of the
ruling was only a weak domestic partnership act that conferred limited medical visitation, decisionmaking rights, tax exemptions and some health and pension benefits. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A2(d) (West Supp. 2005); Weiser, supra note 37, at 61. The New Jersey legislature has enacted
legislation effective February 2007, establishing civil unions between same-sex couples and
granting these couples the same recognition, rights and benefits of married couples. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 26:8A-4.1 (West Supp. 2006) (effective Feb. 19, 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-28 (West Supp.
2006) (effective Feb. 19, 2007).
45. Lewis, 908 A.2d at 221.
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adoptive parent has previously not cared for.",4 6 Recently, states have
begun to allow a homosexual couple to jointly adopt 47 a child, instead of
forcing them to go through an additional court proceeding.48 Also, a
fairly new development that has received widespread attention, both in
literature and by the courts, is second-parent adoptions.
Second-parent adoptions are adoptions by a cohabitating partner of
a legal parent, which results in recognition of this second parent as an
additional legal parent without terminating the parental rights of the birth
parent.49 With regard to second-parent adoptions, the courts have not
distinguished between cases where one of the parents is a genetic parent
of the child, and cases where one of the parents had already adopted the
child. 50 The Uniform Adoption Act illustrates one of the few legislative
attempts to facilitate joint parenting arrangements among partners in
non-marital relationships. 5' And, "promot[ing] the interest[s] of minor
46. Marc E. Elovitz, Adoption by Lesbian and Gay People: The Use and Mis-use of Social
Science Research, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 207, 207 (1995). Of course, this approach can
only be taken if the individual resides in a state that allows homosexuals to adopt.
47. "The term 'joint adoption' was used to designate adoption of a child by both members of
a couple, a practice unheard of earlier unless the couple was married." David L. Chambers & Nancy
D. Polikoff, Family Law and Gay and Lesbian Family Issues in the Twentieth Century, 33 FAM.
L.Q. 523, 538 (1999).
48. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15A, § 1-102(b) (2002); Editorial, The Adoption of Common Sense, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1997, at
A26 (discussing New Jersey's decision to allow homosexual couples to adopt).
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5
reporter's note 6, cmt. i (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1998). The reasoning behind second-parent
adoptions is that to eliminate the rights of a legal parent who intended to continue to raise and rear
the child would go again'st common sense, and not serve the best interests of the children involved.
See, e.g., Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1274 (Vt. 1993) (discussing a Vermont adoption
statute that provided a step-parent exception and a D.C. case, which "likened same-sex partners who
adopted to step-parents").
50. See Mark A. Momjian, Cause of Action for Second-ParentAdoptions, in 25 CAUSES OF
ACTION SECOND § 36, at 29 (2004).
51. See Jane S. Schacter, Constructing Families in a Democracy: Courts, Legislatures and
Second-ParentAdoption, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933, 934-35 (2000). Section 4-102 of the Uniform
Adoption Act, can be applied to second-parent adoptions, stating:
(a) A stepparent has standing under this [article] to petition to adopt a minor stepchild
who is the child of the stepparent's spouse... [and] (b) For good cause shown, a court
may allow an individual who does not meet the requirements of subsection (a), but has
the consent of the custodial parent of a minor to file a petition for adoption under this
[article]. A petition allowed under this subsection must be treated as if the petitioner
[parent] were a stepparent.
Uniform Adoption Act § 4-102(a)-(b), 9 U.L.A. 104-05 (1994). Additionally, the Act provides:
An adoption by a stepparent does not affect.., the relationship between the adoptee and
the adoptee's parent who is the adoptive stepparent's spouse or deceased spouse; . .. [or]
the right of the adoptee or a descendant of the adoptee to inheritance or intestate
succession through or from the adoptee's former parent ....
Id. § 4-103, 9 U.L.A. at 106.
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children in being raised by individuals who are committed to,
and
52
Act.
the
of
aims
primary
the
of
one
is
them"
for
caring
of,
capable
Second-parent adoptions allow same-sex parents, who are generally
prohibited from marrying each other, to have legally recognizable
families. A child benefits by having two stable parental units with the
concomitant duties and responsibilities of being a parent, including
custody, visitation, support, and inheritance, rather than only one legally
recognized parent.5 3 The Human Rights Campaign Foundation reports
that second-parent adoptions have been allowed by statute or approved
by appellate courts in eight states and the District of Columbia.54
Second-parent adoptions have also been permitted by multiple lower
courts, but this means that the question of whether such an adoption will
be granted depends on the individual regional jurisdiction or county, and
not the state as a whole.55
56
The first state to allow second-parent adoptions was Vermont.
The case, In re Adoption of B.L. V.B., 57 involved a lesbian couple who
decided together to parent a child. One mother had two children by
artificial insemination and the other partner wished to adopt the children.
The Vermont Supreme Court looked to the intent of the legislature when
analyzing the adoption statute. The court claimed it was "furthering the
purposes of the statute.., by allowing the children of such unions the
benefits and security of a legal relationship with their de facto second
parents. ' 58
59
The courts in the cases that have allowed second-parent adoptions
have emphasized the best interests of the child and have suggested that
"[s]econd parent adoption can secure the salutary incidents of legally
52. Momjian, supra note 50, § 4, at 12.
53. See id. §§ 7-8, at 13-14.
54. Human
Rights
Campaign
Foundation,
Second-Parent
Adoption,
http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Adoption&ContentlD= 18341&Template=/ContentMana
gement/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Mar. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Human Rights].
55. Id.
56. Craig W. Christensen, If Not Marriage?On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family Values by
a "Simulacrum of Marriage", 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1767 (1998).
57. 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
58. Id. at 1276.
59. See, e.g., Sharon v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 557-58 (Cal. 2003); In re Adoption of
K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253, 1260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004); In re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315,
321 (Mass. 1993); In re Adoption of Two Children, 666 A.2d 535, 539 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1995); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 405 (N.Y. 1995) ("[A] construction of the [statute's] section
that would deny children.., the opportunity of having their two de facto parents become their legal
parents, based solely on their biological mother's sexual orientation or marital status, would not
only be unjust under the circumstances, but also might raise constitutional concerns in light of the
adoption statute's historically consistent purpose-the best interests of the child.").
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recognized parentage for a child of a nonbiological parent who otherwise
must remain a legal stranger., 60 Recognizing the second parent who is
and wants to continue playing the parental role will benefit the child by
providing both psychological and financial support. So, there has been a
significant development in this area of the law, and in quite a few
jurisdictions, same-sex parents have secured another way to legalize
their families. 6 '
Unfortunately, there are many jurisdictions where the children in
these situations are only allowed to have one legally recognized parent.
This is because there are many states that do not allow same-sex couples
to qualify for these second-parent adoptions, 62 as well as many states
where only certain counties or courts have allowed this type of
adoption. 63 Courts that deny second-parent adoptions "are likely to read
the state adoption statute narrowly, interpreting it to prohibit a child
from having two legally recognized same-sex parents. 64 Since
"[a]doption is a creature of statute, 65 courts have the ability to interpret
the applicable statutes accordingly, and courts that take this approach are
not required to consider the best interests of the child.66 In addition, there

60. Sharon, 73 P.3d at 568.
61. See Human Rights, supra note 54.
62. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042 (West 2005); Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children &
Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 827 (1 lth Cir. 2004) (upholding Florida statute banning adoption by
homosexual parents). According to the Human Rights Watch Foundation Campaign, only twentysix states offer second-parent adoptions as an option (and eighteen of those are determined county
by county and are in jeopardy of being overturned); this leaves twenty-four states that provide no
second-parent adoption possibility. Human Rights, supra note 54; see also, e.g., In re Adoption of
T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488, 496 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 383
(Neb. 2002); infra note 69 and accompanying text.
63. This is because, as Chief Judge Kaye observed, "the decision regarding whether to confer
legal status to both mothers is solely within the discretion of the court." See Law, supra note 35, at
708 (citing Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 404 n.4).
64. BRASHIER, supra note 12, at 160.
65. Id. at 163.
66. Id.
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are a few states that do not allow homosexuals
to adopt at all, 67 and one
68
that explicitly prohibits them from doing so.
An example of a court that refused to extend the step-parent
exception in the applicable statute to same-sex parent situations, is In re
Interest of Angel Lace M.69 The child at issue had been adopted by a
husband and a wife prior to their divorce, and the husband voluntarily
relinquished his rights in order to allow the child to be adopted by the
mother's new female partner. The court found that the only way the
partner could adopt the child was if the birth mother's rights were
terminated. 70 Not only is this is an unacceptable option for a child who is
being deprived of the benefits and securities associated with two loving
and committed parents, but it fails to solve the larger problem discussed
in this Note.
However, the answer is not to secure second-parent adoptions in the
still-hesitant jurisdictions. Second-parent adoptions are a good "in the
meantime" solution, but they are certainly not the best solution. In fact,
even in states that allow this option, many children are still not
guaranteed the rights that are given without question to children of
heterosexual parents. For example, some parents will simply forego the
adoption route if they are content with the situation as it is, and will not
think about the future of the children involved. Or, they may intend to go
forward with adoption proceedings but, for one reason or another, the
adoption simply does not occur. It is unjust and irrational to punish the
children for this lapse of judgment on the part of their parents.
Furthermore, even if same-sex parents obtain a second-parent adoption
67. See Momjian, supra note 50, § 30, at 27-28. Even where state statutes do not explicitly
state that homosexuals cannot adopt, some make it almost impossible for them to do so. Id. One
example is Utah, where the statute says a "child may not be adopted by a person who is cohabiting
in a relationship that is not a legally valid and binding marriage under the laws of this state." UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-30-1 (2002). Since a homosexual cannot marry in Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-12(5) (2002), this effectively forbids adoption of a child. And Mississippi, where unmarried
individuals have the right to adopt, and thus presumably a gay or lesbian person could adopt alone,
the statute explicitly states: "Adoption by couples of the same gender is prohibited." MISS. CODE
ANN. § 93-17-3 (West Supp. 2005).
68. Florida's adoption statute states: "No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt
if that person is a homosexual." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042 (West 2005). In Lofton v. Secretary of
the Department of Children and Family Services, the court upheld the Florida statute that forbids
homosexuals from adopting children. The Eleventh Circuit determined "it is not in the best interests
of its displaced children to be adopted by individuals who 'engage in current, voluntary homosexual
activity"' and that there is "nothing in the Constitution that forbids this policy judgment." 358 F.3d
804, 827 (1 th Cir. 2004) (quoting Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210,
1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
69. 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994).
70. Id. at 686.
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in one state, other states may refuse to enforce the order. 71 Second-parent
adoptions are not the best way to address the needs of these children.
While they illustrate a positive alternative in the meantime, the change
needs to be more comprehensive and it must be available to all children
who are living with two parents of the same sex, regardless of the state
in which they happen to be born or raised.
3. Co-parenting Agreements
Another option that warrants brief mention is the use of shared
(or co-) parenting agreements. These agreements "serve the purpose of
providing the non-biological parent with specific rights and
responsibilities toward a child., 72 These agreements have typically been
used for custody and support issues, but there is no guarantee that a court
will uphold such an agreement, even if it serves the best interests of the
child.73
In fact, a recent Florida decision, Wakeman v. Dixon, declined to
enforce a joint parenting agreement between two lesbian parents that
stipulated that, in the event of a separation, Wakeman, who sought to be
deemed the child's de facto parent, would be entitled to visitation.74 The
court reasoned that Florida does not allow non-parents to seek custody
and visitation, and that essentially Wakeman was a non-parent. The
district court found that the material facts were indistinguishable from a
prior case, Music v. Rachford, where Music sought shared parental
responsibility and visitation after jointly raising the child with her former
partner.7 5 In that case, the biological mother denied contact and the court
denied Music recognition as a de facto parent.7 6 The fact that Wakeman
involved an actual co-parenting agreement was irrelevant since such
"agreements are unenforceable to the extent they purport to grant
parental rights" to a non-parent.77 Of course, in essence, this decision
solidified the position that the non-biological parent in a gay or lesbian
relationship has no right to even visit with the child.78 As a corollary,
71. While states are supposed to give full faith and credit to decisions made by other states,
they sometimes get around this requirement using the argument of states' rights, declaring
recognition of the adoption to be contrary to public policy. See BURDA, supra note 9, at 25.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. 921 So. 2d 669, 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
75. See id. at 673 (citing Music v. Rachford, 654 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
76. Music, 654 So. 2d at 1235.
77. Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 673.
78. Since Florida does not allow homosexuals to marry, join in a domestic partnership or civil
union, nor does it recognize any other similar arrangement, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (LexisNexis
2005), and because Florida does not allow gays or lesbians to adopt, see supra note 68 and
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this means that children of such relationships have no legal rights with
regard to this parent either.79
In addition, shared parenting agreements also carry some of the
same problems as wills in that they have to be drafted and are subject to
challenges. And while there are cases that have sustained these
agreements when they reflect the best interests of the child, they tend to
deal with custody and visitation, rather than inheritance. 80 In addition,
where second-parent adoptions are permitted, the states fail to encourage
shared parenting agreements, and thus the parties do not receive the
degree of legal protection for their families that they otherwise would.8'
C. Common Law Doctrines (AlternativeTheories)
The common law has long served as a method for securing
additional rights or allowances that are not easily drawn from a statutory
provision.82 Common law doctrines tend to reflect underlying public
policy, and thus provide another route that same-sex couples can take
when attempting to legitimize or secure the relationships with their
children. The underlying principle that governs83 most common law
claims is the best interest and welfare of the child.

accompanying text, shared parenting agreements provided the only possible avenue of protection for
the children of same-sex parents. Refusing to recognize such an agreement leaves the child
completely vulnerable and with no possible remedy.
79. This fact was actually recognized in Judge Van Nortwick's concurrence in Wakeman:
"[T]he child in the non-traditional family in Florida is not protected either by statutory rights or by
the ability of courts to secure the best interests of the child when the household dissolves."
Wakeman, 921 So. 2d at 675 (Van Nortwick, J., concurring).
80. See, e.g., A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 663-64 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992); see also 7 SAMUEL
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 16:21, at 469-70 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th
ed. 1997) ("[S]ome co-parenting agreements, granting visitation rights to a parent's companion, do
not necessarily violate public policy and are not unenforceable per se; instead they are subject to
modification by the court based on the best interests of the child.").
81. BURDA, supranote 9, at 27.
82. See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law
Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 15, 20 (1995) ("Indeed, the
common law and state constitutional law often stand as alternative grounds for individual
rights.... Even in a world dominated by statutes, there remain clear, direct links with the common
law.") (footnote omitted).
83. See, e.g., Ex parte G.C., 924 So. 2d 651, 664 (Ala. 2005) (Smith, J., concurring); see also
Developments in the Law-The Law of Marriage and Family, Changing Realities of Parenthood:
The Law's Response to the Evolving American Family and Emerging Reproductive Technologies,
116 HARv. L. REV. 2052, 2064 (2003) ("[T]he rationales underlying judicial efforts to expand
recognition of parents support the actual bestowal of parental status on nonparents and recognition
that the best interests of a child should sometimes govern the determination of who functions as his
or her parent.").
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The treatise Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution describes a
parent as either a legal parent, a parent by estoppel, or a de facto
parent.8 4 The treatise suggests that marriage is not essential to the
creation of parental status, nor is it essential that the parents be of the
opposite sex; thus, it allows a same-sex couple to undertake joint
parenting rights and responsibilities, and deems them permanent.85 One
condition, for both a parent by estoppel and a de facto parent, is that
86
there be an agreement between the legal parent and the other parent.
While this agreement may be implied, it requires affirmative acts
demonstrating 87a willingness and anticipation of shared parental
responsibilities.
A de facto parent is "one who, 'on a day-to-day basis, assumes the
role of parent, seeking to fulfill both the child's physical needs and his
[or her] psychological need for affection and care.' 88 A de facto parent
has also been referred to as a psychological parent or a functional
parent.89
Rubano v. DiCenzo90 provides a discussion of the idea surrounding
a de facto parent. The Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that where
parents jointly decided to conceive a child by artificial insemination and
raise him or her together, the petitioner is entitled to "[1]egal recognition
of a de facto or 'psychological parent' and child relationshipnotwithstanding the absence of any biological ties." 9'
In In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.,92 a Wisconsin court went further,

allowing visitation where there is a parent-like relationship and
significant triggering event, and applying a four-part test to demonstrate
the existence of a parent-child relationship.93 This test has been cited and
84. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1), at 107-08 (2002). These recommendations are controversial but at
the very least they provide some excellent guidelines for states to consider.

85. See id.
86. Id.
87. See id.
88. Susan E. Dalton, From Presumed Fathers toLesbian Mothers: Sex Discrimination and
the Legal Construction of Parenthood, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 261, 295 (2003) (quoting In re
B.G., 523 P.2d 244, 253 n.18 (Cal. 1974)).
89. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 546 n.3 (N.J. 2000). Black's Law Dictionary defines a
psychological parent as "[a] person who, on a continuing and regular basis, provides for a child's
emotional and physical needs ....The psychological parent may be the biological parent, a foster
parent, a guardian, a common-law parent, or some other person unrelated to the child." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1145 (8th ed. 2004).

90.
91.
92.
93.

759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000).
Id. at 974.
533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
The four elements that the petitioner must prove are:
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used by many subsequent courts in analyzing this question.9 4 However,
this test was developed in response to an issue of visitation, so it is
questionable how far a court would be willing to extend its application.
In fact, in none of these cases has a child been able to inherit from a
this theory has been
psychological parent who died intestate. 95 Rather,
96
successful primarily in visitation proceedings.
The second theory is referred to as "in loco parentis," and "literally
means in the place of a parent. ' '97 A person with such standing "has put
him or herself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the
obligations incident to the parental relation, without going through the
formalities necessary to a legal adoption." 98 Thus, an in loco parentis
relationship exists only in situations where the parent intends to assume
this parental status for the child. 99
Another common law doctrine is that of the equitable parent, which
allows a husband who is not biologically related to a child to be
considered the natural father if the child was born during the marriage,
where a relationship has been mutually acknowledged. 100 This theory
essentially creates a presumption of paternity that serves to legitimize
the child.
Equitable estoppel can also be applied as a fourth theory to obtain
rights normally reserved for legal parents.10 1 Equitable estoppel occurs

(1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the petitioner's
formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child; (2) that the
petitioner and the child lived together in the same household; (3) that the petitioner
assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child's
care, education and development, including contributing towards the child's support,
without expectation of financial compensation; and (4) that the petitioner has been in a
parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded,
dependent relationship parental in nature.
Id. at 435-36 (footnote omitted).
94. See, e.g., Youmans v. Ramos, 711 N.E.2d 165, 170 n.15 (Mass. 1999); V.C., 748 A.2d at
551.
95. See BURDA, supra note 9, at 70.
96. E.N.O.v.L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 866, 893 n.1 I (Mass. 1999); VC., 748 A.2d at 555.
97. 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 345, at 425 (2003 & Supp. 2006) (citing Geibe v. Geibe,
571 N.W.2d 774, 781 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)).
98. Id. § 345, at 425-26 (citing State ex rel. Hopkins v. Batt, 573 N.W.2d 425, 433 (Neb.
1998)).
99. Geibe, 571 N.W.2d at 781 (stating that "residing with a child is a necessary, but not alone
sufficient, condition for an in loco parentis relationship" and that Minnesota, as well as other states
relying on the principle of in loco parentis, requires that the parent "intend to assume parental
responsibilities").
100. See, e.g., York v. Morofsky, 571 N.W.2d 524, 526 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
101. Principlesof the Law of Family Dissolution discusses a theory of parent by estoppel that
contains elements of the equitable parent doctrine and equitable estoppel, as an individual who,

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss2/18

18

Trast: You Can't Choose Your Parents: Why Children Raised by Same-Sex Co
2006]

CHILDREN RAISED BY SAME-SEX COUPLES

when a spouse is estopped from denying paternity when he represents or
holds himself out to be the father of the child. Likewise, a mother may
be estopped from denying paternity in these situations. 10 2 Again, these
theories have been invoked primarily in custody battles and cases
concerning visitation, so while some courts have allowed same-sex
parents to secure minimal rights under these doctrines, they are not a
particularly viable route for inheritance issues. However, in some
instances equitable adoption has been utilized to secure inheritance
rights for the child.
Equitable adoption is generally considered "a limited, last-resort
inheritance claim" brought "when a child reasonably believed and relied
on the putative parents' indications that they were his adoptive
parents."'' 0 3 It incorporates aspects of the other equitable theories and
allows a child to recover based on actions and reliance, even in the
absence of a formal adoption. It is therefore the only doctrine that
directly addresses the problem of inheritance laws discussed in this
Note.
Equitable adoption has been justified on the grounds that the child
detrimentally relied on his or her foster parent's promise to adopt, which
allows the court to provide an equitable remedy entitling the child to
inherit as if the promise had not been broken. 104 Other courts, relying on
contract theory, require adequate consideration by the party in question
to achieve equitable adoption. 0 5 An equitable adoption must be
affirmatively established, and must be decided on the basis of its own
facts and evidence. As such, equitable adoption might be said to be a
hybrid blended theory of contract law and equity:
Under common law principles... a child may become "equitably"
adopted by judicial declaration, notwithstanding the purportedly
exclusive statutory scheme for adoption ....
.. "The theoretical underpinnings of [this theory]" are based upon
either "the specific performance of a contract to adopt or an equitable

though not a legal parent, has acted as a parent under specified circumstances that serve to estop the
legal parent from denying the individual's status. AM. LAW INST., supra note 84, § 2.03(b), at 107.
102. See, e.g., In re Paternity of D.L.H., 419 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Wis. 1987).
103. BRASHIER, supra note 12, at 167. The "doctrine is sometimes referred to as virtual
adoption, adoption by estoppel, or de facto adoption." Id. at 164.
104. Spitko, supra note 36, at 280.
105. See D'Accardi ex rel. Vigil v. Chater, 96 F.3d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1996) (applying New
Jersey law).
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has been agreed to between the
estoppel to deny that an adoption"
' 6
putative adopter and adoptee. 0

Most courts require proof of a valid contract to adopt between the
decedent and the natural parent.10 7 However, there is another approach
that focuses less on the contract and more on the function of the
relationship, psychological parent theories, and the "equities of the
by the West Virginia Supreme
scenario." 10 8 This approach was adopted
10 9
Court of Appeals in Welch v. Wilson.

The doctrine, as adopted by the Welch court, requires proof "by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that [the equitable child] has
stood from an age of tender years in a position exactly equivalent to that
of a formally adopted or natural child."" The court suggested that a
"family centered society presumes that bonds of love and loyalty will
prevail in the distribution of family wealth along family lines .... [A]n
equitably adopted child in practical terms is as much a family member as
a formally adopted child and should not be the subject of
discrimination.""' The doctrine is essentially meant to apply to those
who have filled the place of a natural child but have not been legally
oversight and the intent to adopt is
adopted because of fault 1 or
12
established by the evidence.
Of course, there are jurisdictions that will not allow equitable
adoptions,' 1 3 and the burden of proof is not an easy one to meet. The

106. William G. Reeves, Inheritance by Equitable Adoption: An Overview of Theory and
Proof 57 J. Mo. B. 130, 130 (2001) (quoting Weidner v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 928 S.W.2d
401,403 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)).
107. See Spitko, supra note 36, at 280.
108. BRASHIER, supra note 12, at 164.
109. 516 S.E.2d 35 (W. Va. 1999). In Welch, the appellant was transferred to her maternal
grandmother's home within six months of her birth, and was raised by her grandmother and her
step-grandfather, John Wilson, for fifteen years. Id. at 36. "While the Wilsons did not seek formal
adoption, school records indicated that [they] were the Appellant's parents. The evidence indicated
Id. at 36. Upon John's death, appellant claimed she
they functioned as the parental authorities ....
had been equitably adopted by the decedent. The West Virginia Supreme Court found that the
appellant proved by "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, that she enjoyed a status within the
decedent's home and family identical to that of a formally adopted child." Id. at 38.
110. Id. at 37 (citing Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co. v. Singer, 250 S.E.2d 369, 373 (W. Va.
1978)).
Ill. Id.
112. In re Estate of Furia, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 384, 387 (Ct. App. 2002).
113. A narrow majority of jurisdictions do allow equitable adoption. Kristine S. Knaplund,
GrandparentsRaising Grandchildrenand the Implicationsfor Inheritance,48 ARIz. L. REV. 1, 6
(2006). Those that do not include, for example, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, South Carolina, and
Wisconsin. See King v. Schweiker, 647 F.2d 541, 545-46 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying Louisiana law);
Lindsey v. Wilcox, 479 N.E.2d 1330, 1332 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); In re Estate of Robbins, 738 P.2d
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child must be unaware that there was no legal adoption and in order to
receive anything from the decedent's intestate estate, the mistaken belief
that he or she was in fact adopted must come from the words or conduct
of the decedent." 14 The child must further demonstrate that the decedent
took him or her in at a relatively young age and illustrate that the
decedent did in fact raise the child as his or her own. 115 Generally, a
child seeking to inherit must also prove circumstances that merit a
finding of equitable adoption, such as: "the benefits of love and affection
accruing to the adopting party, the performances of services by the
child ....society, companionship and filial obedience of the
child ....[and] reliance by the adopted person upon the existence his [or
her] adoptive status."' 16 While this list is certainly not exhaustive, and is
discussed with regard to establishing an equitable parent relationship
between a child and his or her foster or putative adoptive parents, the
elements of proof can arguably be applied in similar situations, including
relationships involving same-sex couples and their children.
But these are difficult requirements, and this doctrine is limited. In
addition, while the elements of this doctrine may be broadly interpreted
by the courts to apply to same-sex parents and their children, this was
not the area it was meant to address and therefore many jurisdictions will
probably refuse to extend it to do so. While the other theories have been
used by homosexual parents to gain custody, support and visitation
rights, it does not appear that equitable adoption, although the best
option for inheritance purposes, has been raised by a child with parents
of the same gender, or by a non-biological parent on the child's behalf.
Thus, it is unclear whether any court would allow such a child to recover
under this doctrine.

458, 462-63 (Kan. 1987); Alley v. Bennett, 379 S.E.2d 294, 295 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989); In re
Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 431 (Wis. 1995).
114.
115.

BRASHIER,supra note 12, at 164.
Id.

116. Welch v. Wilson, 516 S.E.2d 35, 38 (W. Va. 1999); see also WILLISTON, supra note 80,
§ 16:21, at 470-71 (1997). Williston outlines the following principles:
1. The promisor must promise in writing or orally to adopt the child;
2. Consideration flowing to the promisor must consist of the promisee parents turning
the child over to the promisor, and the child must thereafter give filial affection,
devotion, association and obedience to the promisor during the latter's lifetime;
3. In such a case, if, upon the death of the promisor, the child has not been made the
legally adopted child of the promisor, equity will decree that to be done which was
intended to be done and specifically enforce the contract to adopt; and
4. The child will then be entitled to inherit that portion of the promisor's estate which
he would have inherited had the adoption been formal.
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On the other hand, the other common law doctrines are being
invoked at an increasing rate by same-sex parents who have no other
means to secure the relationship with their child. California has adopted
the Uniform Parentage Act," 7 allowing a court to determine that a child
may have two parents, both of whom are women.' 18 This court suggested
that same-sex couples who raise children have the same rights and
responsibilities as heterosexual parents. 1 9 And, other courts have been
granting similar protection to the non-legal parent in homosexual
relationships upon the dissolution of the relationship. 20 Courts are
therefore attempting to "vindicate the public interest in the children's
financial support and emotional well-being by developing theories of
parenthood, so that 'legal strangers' who are de facto parents may be
awarded custody or visitation or reached for support."'' These rulings
illustrate a trend of acceptance of this notion that a child may in fact
have two parents of the same gender. However, there is still a significant
number of jurisdictions that will not extend the common law doctrines to
same-sex families. 2 2 Additionally, these theories are unpredictable and
are subject to interpretation by each court; thus, the decisions are not
uniform and their application will vary from state to state. Also, even in
those jurisdictions that do grant these parents some rights, the doctrines
have not been successful in achieving inheritance rights for the children.
The theories simply are not broad enough to secure rights for this type of
family. Furthermore, they are determined on a case-by-case basis. In
117. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7600 (West 2004).
118. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 673 (Cal. 2005) (Kennard, J., concurring).
Judge Kennard further stated that the children, "no less than any other children in the state, have a
right to support from both their parents." Id.
119. Id. at 666 (majority opinion) (observing that the court "perceive[s] no reason why both
parents of a child cannot be women"); see also Bob Egelko, Court GrantsEqual Rights to Same-Sex
Parents:Breaking up PartnershipsDoesn't End ParentalObligations, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 23, 2005,
at Al.
120. In V.C. v. MJ.B., the court stated that "[a]lthough the case arises in the context of a
lesbian couple, the standard we enunciate is applicable to all persons who have willingly, and with
the approval of the legal parent, undertaken the duties of a parent to a child not related by blood or
adoption." 748 A.2d 539, 542 (N.J. 2000). The Massachusetts court in E.N.O. v. L.M.M. similarly
stated:
The recognition of de facto parents is in accord with notions of the modem family. An
increasing number of same gender couples ...are deciding to have children. It is to be
expected that children of nontraditional families, like other children, form parent
relationships with both parents, whether those parents are legal or de facto.
711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999).
121. Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Vt. 1993).
122. In addition, it is likely that recovery under many of these common law doctrines would be
prohibited under state versions of DOMA. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204 (Vernon 2002 &
Supp. 2006) (barring recognition of foreign same-sex marriages and civil unions).
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other words, the doctrines can only be of use to those individuals who
choose (and who can afford) litigation, and even then there is no
guarantee that their rights will be recognized.
D. None of the Available Options Are Acceptable
None of the options available to children of same-sex parents in
their attempts to secure inheritance rights are sufficient. All of the
options mentioned have a common and fundamental flaw in that they
focus on the parents' status and not on the rights of the children. In
addition, there are only limited jurisdictions that allow same-sex
marriage, civil unions or domestic partnerships, and this Note is not
intended to advocate for that change. Second-parent adoptions are only
temporary, and do not solve the underlying problem that these children
face since there is a fear that in many cases a formal adoption will not
actually take place. The common law alternatives provide broad
interpretations to current statutory laws, but most of these doctrines
cannot be applied to ensure inheritance rights. Even if courts were to
allow recovery under an equitable adoption theory, the only way to
assert such a right is through litigation and this continues to leave the
rights of these children to the discretion of the courts.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no
state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws. 123 Children raised by gay or lesbian parents are no different
than children raised by heterosexual parents, single parents, grandparents
or any other type of family in the United States today. Children raised by
same-sex parents actually share many of the same attributes as children
born out of wedlock. 24 Since the Supreme Court in 1977 held it
unconstitutional to discriminate against non-marital children, 25 it
follows that denying children of same-sex parents the right to inherit
from both of their parents violates their constitutional rights under the
Equal Protection Clause.

123. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
124. See infra Part III.C.
125. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
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The Road to Equal Rights

A challenge to a statutory classification under equal protection uses
one of three standards of review.12 6 Strict scrutiny is applied when a
fundamental right is at issue, or when the targeted group is a suspect
class, like a group of a particular race or national origin.'2 7 This standard
requires the state to prove it has a compelling interest in the regulation of
the group, and to show that the legislation is narrowly tailored to address
this interest.128 The intermediate level of review is used when the nature
of the classification is a quasi-suspect class, such as sex 129 or
illegitimacy. 3 This level of review requires a showing that the
legislation is substantially related to an important state interest. 1 ' The
easiest burden to satisfy is rational basis review and is used to uphold
state legislation that affects a non-suspect class, like age or mental
disability. 3 2 Under this analysis, the state must only indicate there is a
legitimate state interest involved and show that the legislation is
reasonably related or connected to such interest.1 33 The courts also tend
to give great deference to state legislation considered to be social or
134
economic regulation and apply rule of rational basis review.
B.

The Story of the Fatherless

Under the common law, children born out of wedlock were deemed
illegitimate; that is, they were considered children of no one and had no
rights to inheritance.135 Eventually they gained recognition as their
mothers' children, but most states still refused to allow these children to
inherit from their fathers outside the institution of marriage, 136 unless
they were explicitly provided for in a will. Intestate laws allowed only
for recovery through the mother and therefore left these children without
the financial support they deserved and to which they were entitled.
126. For an overview of the standards, see generally 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.3, at 216-18 (3d

ed. 1999).
127. See id. § 18.3, at 216-28; See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
128. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
129. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996).
130. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 767.
131. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441.
132. See, e.g., id. at 444-46.
133. Id. at 440.
134. Id.
135. ANDERSEN, supra note 4, § 5, at 18; SCOTT E. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF PARENT-CHILD
RELATIONSHIPS: A HANDBOOK 80 (1992).

136. Dalton, supranote 88, at 269.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss2/18

24

Trast: You Can't Choose Your Parents: Why Children Raised by Same-Sex Co
CHILDREN RAISED BY SAME-SEX COUPLES

2006]

The rights of non-marital children developed throughout the 1970s
and 1980s. Levy v. Louisiana'37 was one of the first cases to recognize
that children in this situation were entitled to constitutional protection.
The Court held that illegitimate children are not non-persons; rather,
"[t]hey are clearly 'persons' within the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'' 38 This case dealt with recovery
under a wrongful death statute rather than inheritance law, but it
signified the start of the trend in recognizing the rights of this class of
citizens.
Following Levy, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the
Court held that a state statute that denied equal workmen's compensation
recovery rights to unacknowledged non-marital children violated the
Equal Protection Clause.139 The Court stated that the children at issue
were "dependent children, and as such are entitled to rights granted to
other dependent children.' 140 Reiterating the logic in Levy, the Court
went further and held:
[I]mposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic
concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship
to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is
responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an
ineffectual-as well as an unjust-way of deterring the parent.141
In Trimble v. Gordon,142 the Court held that a provision of the
Illinois Probate Act, which allowed children born out of wedlock to
inherit through intestate succession only from their mothers, denied
equal protection as that classification was based on illegitimacy and bore
no rational relation to a legitimate state purpose. 43 The court indicated
that the state interest in promoting legitimate family relationships is
unrelated to the difference in the rights afforded to illegitimate children

137.

391 U.S. 68 (1968).

138. Id. at 70, 72 (holding that denial to illegitimate children of right to recover for wrongful
death of their mother on whom they were dependent constituted invidious discrimination against the
children).
139. 406 U.S. 164, 174-76(1972).
140. Id. at 170.
141. Id.at 175.
142. 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (declaring unconstitutional a statute that required subsequent
marriage for recovery, and finding that the fact that the father could have made a will did not cure
the constitutional defect).
143. Id. at 764-66. Children born out of wedlock have been recognized as a constitutionally
protected quasi-suspect class the classification of which must survive a heightened level of scrutiny.
See, e.g., id. at 767; see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442
(1985).
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as compared to the rights given to legitimate children in the estates of
their mothers and fathers. 44 The Court stated that "parents have the
ability to conform their conduct to societal norms, but their illegitimate
children can affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own status. 145
The Court also suggested that "[e]vidence of paternity may take a
variety of forms, some creating more significant problems of inaccuracy
and inefficiency than others. The states ... are free to recognize these
differences in fashioning their requirements of proof."' 46 The holding in
Trimble applies to forms of proof that would not compromise the state's
interest, for example where there is a prior adjudication or a formal
47
acknowledgement of paternity. 1
A year after the Court decided Trimble, it heard Lalli v. Lalli, a case
brought by an out-of-wedlock son to recover from his father's estate. 48
A plurality of the court found that the New York statute requiring a
filiation order during the lifetime of the father was substantially related
to the important state interest in providing for the just and orderly
disposition of property at death. 149 Therefore, section 4-1.2 of the New
York Estates, Powers and Trusts Law, the statute at issue in Lalli, was
50
held not to violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Finally, in 1986 the Court made clear that restrictions regarding
children born out-of-wedlock were entitled to an intermediate level of
scrutiny. In Clark v. Jeter, a Pennsylvania six-year statute of limitations
for paternity actions did not withstand the changed, heightened level of
scrutiny required of legislation disadvantaging this class under the Equal
Protection Clause.'15 While this case dealt with support in general, rather
than inheritance law, the use of this higher level of scrutiny further
144. See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 768 n.13 (1977); FRIEDMAN supra note 135, at 81.
145. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 770.
146. Id. at 773 n.14.
147. Id.
148. 439 U.S. 259, 261-62 (1978).
149. Id. at 275. The dissent suggested the state could meet its goals in less drastic ways: "New
York has available less drastic means of screening out fraudulent claims .... The New York statute
on review here, like the Illinois statute in Trimble, excludes 'forms of proof which do not
compromise the State['s] interests."' Id. at 278-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Trimble, 430
U.S. at 772 n.14).
150. Id. at 275-76 (majority opinion). The New York statute was amended in 1979, so as to
provide that a child born out of wedlock can inherit from his or her father if the filiation order was
obtained in the first ten years of the child's life (not merely during the first two years), or if the
father had signed an instrument acknowledging paternity. 1979 N.Y. Sess. Laws 378 (McKinney);
see also N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (Consol. 2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5 reporter's note 1, cmt. a (Tentative Draft No.

2, 1998).
151. 486 U.S. 456, 461,463(1988).
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emphasized the need for constitutional protection with regard to this
class of children, and affirmed that this was the correct standard to apply
when addressing equal protection challenges.
Since these rulings, a majority of states have amended their
intestate laws or have passed new statutes that allow for children born
out of wedlock to recover from both their mother and their father. As
indicated in Trimble, the states retain some leeway in determining the
requirements for meeting the standard of proof to recover from the
father. 52 Most of the state statutes require one or more of a given list of
options. These conditions include (but are not limited to): the mother and
father attempted to marry or participated in a marriage ceremony even if
the marriage is later determined to be void; there is a notarized or
witnessed statement or written acknowledgement that the child is in fact
the father's child; the father openly treated the child as his own; the
father's name is on the birth certificate; or a genetic test proves
paternity.153
C. Why the CurrentStatutesAre Unconstitutional
Children of same-sex parents are entitled to an intermediate
standard of review. The Supreme Court has determined that illegitimacy
deserves a more exacting analysis, 54 as legislation targeting such groups
is usually based in part on prejudices and biases and frequently bears no
relation to the person's ability to perform or contribute to society.' 55 The
Court has acknowledged that classifications based on gender and
illegitimacy are usually arbitrary, and thus unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause. Heightened scrutiny is a difficult burden for the
state to meet, and since the Supreme Court "has struck down

152. See Trimble, 430 U.S. at 773 n.14.
153.

See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814(A) (Supp. 2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 45a-438(b) (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-3(2)(A) (1997); MD. CODE ANN., EST. &
TRUSTS § 1-208 (LexisNexis 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 700.2114 (West 2002 & Supp.

2006); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(a)(2) (Consol. 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 29A-2-114(c) (2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 852.05(l) (West 2002 & Supp. 2006).
154. The Supreme Court has granted a higher level of scrutiny to classes with a "'history of
purposeful unequal treatment' or [that have] been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of
stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985) (quoting Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313
(1976)).
155. See, e.g., id. (discussing gender as a classification that warrants heightened scrutiny).
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illegitimacy classifications with some frequency,"'' 56 the current
inheritance statutes are not likely to meet the required standard.
Children of same-sex parents are a quasi-suspect class because they
are analogous to children born out-of-wedlock for inheritance and equal
protection purposes. Children of same-sex parents are non-marital
children by their very definition. 5 7 Also, as the Supreme Court has
already suggested with regard to laws that targeted children born out of
wedlock, children cannot choose their parents. 5 8 In fact, the Court has
"expressly considered and rejected the argument that a State may
attempt to influence the actions of men and women by imposing
' 59
sanctions on the children born of their illegitimate relationships."'
Since most states view relationships between two men or two women as
illegitimate, to punish or sanction these children is, as far as the Court
and the Constitution are concerned, the same as punishing or sanctioning
children born out-of-wedlock. In addition, children of same-sex parents
are subjected to a social stigma just like illegitimate children, "both
classes of children were or are punished by the law for the actions or
status of their parents and both classes of children were or are scorned
by the larger society."' 160 Additionally, dependent children of same-sex
parents are entitled to recover from the estate of both parents. To deny
this right places them in an arbitrary group and violates their
constitutional rights: "[A] statutory classification based on birth out-ofwedlock must, in order to withstand constitutional challenge, be
reasonable and necessary, accommodate the greatest inclusiveness
reasonably possible, and bear an evident and substantial relation to the
particular state interest which the statute is designed to serve.' 6 2
156. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 689 (14th ed.
2001).
157. Because only Massachusetts allows same-sex couples to marry, a child born of their
relationship in any of the remaining states will be out-of-wedlock. See supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
158. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977).
159. Id. at 769.
160. See Kyle C. Velte, Towards ConstitutionalRecognition of the Lesbian-ParentedFamily,
26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 245, 303 (2000-2001) (presenting an equal protection argument
as one of three constitutionally based models to create rights for same-sex parents and their children
and discussing these rights in the context of visitation, custody and child support). The equal
protection argument endorsed in this article can similarly be used to secure inheritance rights for
children with same-sex parents.
161. These children are much like the children in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972), discussed supra notes 139-41.
162. 14 C.J.S. Children Out-of-Wedlock § 65, at 354-55 (2005) (citing United States v. Clark,
455 U.S. 23, 26-27 (1980); Cox v. Schweiker, 684 F.2d 310, 322 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Estate of
Jensen, 162 N.W.2d 861, 877 (N.D. 1968)).
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Although "courts have usually upheld state statutes which impose
' 63
reasonable prerequisites upon a nonmarital child's inheritance rights,"'
the current statutes are not reasonable and make it wholly impossible for
a child with same-sex parents to recover intestate from both parents'
estates. While at least some of the interests put forth by the state are
important governmental interests, the link between the interests and the
targeted legislation "bears only the most attenuated relationship to the
asserted goal"'164 and therefore, under an intermediate standard of
review, they must be declared unconstitutional.
The interests that have been asserted by the states in past cases, and
that are likely to be invoked if future litigation arises, are almost all
legitimate goals. The smooth distribution of estates is an important
governmental interest, and legislation designed to deter frivolous
lawsuits is certainly valid.165 The fear that non-relatives will come out of
the woodwork with claims of an inheritance-worthy relationship is also,
unfortunately, a genuine fear. A state therefore has the right and the need
to eliminate claims of fraud. However, encouraging traditional families
may no longer be accepted as a legitimate legislative aim.16 6 So, while
the preservation of traditional values may be a justifiable interest, the
understanding of family has changed dramatically in recent years and as
the courts begin to recognize the existence of these non-traditional
relationships, 167 this reason may no longer be valid. 168 In addition, the
163.

JOHN DE WITT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 133 (3d ed. 2005).

164. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 768 (1977) (finding that the state's interest in
promoting "[legitimate] family relationships" is not apparent from a statute that penalizes the
children born out of these relationships) (alteration in original).
165. The court in Trimble found that the state's interest in establishing a method of property
disposition was substantial, especially with regard to the "difficulty of proving paternity and the
related danger of spurious claims." Id. at 770. However, the Court suggested that there was a
"middle ground between the extremes of complete exclusion and case-by-case determination of
paternity." Id. at 770-71.
166. The claimed state interest in "preservation of the traditional family" is fundamentally
flawed as it is "under-inclusive because the positive aspects of familial relations can be achieved in
non-traditional structures as well," including same-sex relationships, and over-inclusive in light of
those traditional relationships that are "destructive and dangerous." Linda Fitts Mischler, Personal
Morals Masquerading as Professional Ethics: Regulations Banning Sex Between Domestic
Relations Attorneys and Their Clients, 23 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 37 (2000); see also Gary, supra
note 8, at 27. However, as demonstrated by state DOMAs, states may still decide who may marry
and therefore may still influence the definition of family. For a discussion of state DOMAs, see
Peter Hay, Recognition of Same-Sex Legal Relationships in the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L.
257 (Supp. 2006) and Weiser, supra note 37.
167. See, e.g., Trimble, 430 U.S. at 762; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
(protecting the sexual intimacy of homosexual relationships).
168. Cf David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the ConstitutionalDilemma of the Faultless
Father,41 ARIZ. L. REv. 753, 806 & n.239, 808 (1999) (explaining that the law continues to reflect
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Court in Trimble indicated that "[flor at least some significant categories
of illegitimate children... inheritance rights can be recognized without
jeopardizing the orderly settlement of estates'1 69or the dependability of
titles to property passing under intestacy laws."
The issue of biology is also a very real concern and many states
may suggest that without something as solid as genetics, the standard
will be too loose. Legislatures may fear that the definition of a parent
would become too easy to achieve and this would in turn leave room for
individuals who claim to be children of the decedent, even in only a
functional or psychological way, to attempt to recover from the
decedent's estate. If the line at which states determine who is and who is
not a child were left open to subjective interpretation, this could lead to
claims by alleged children, which the decedent did not intend and with
whom there was not a sufficient connection, to inherit from the estate.
As the need to eliminate fraudulent claims is an important government
concern, the requirements of who fits the definitions of parent and child
need to be clear and even burdensome, and the burden should belong to
the party claiming that such a relationship exists.
However, the current wording of statutes eliminates any and all
claims brought by children of same-sex parents, who not only have a
sufficient connection with their non-biological parent, but also would be
the intended beneficiaries from this parent's estate. As the Court in
Trimble recognized, there is a middle ground between the extremes of
70
complete exclusion and case-by-case determination of paternity.
While it may be more complicated to prove parenthood without the use
of genetic testing, these "[d]ifficulties ...in some situations do not
justify the total statutory disinheritance of... children."'' The Trimble
Court ultimately found that the statute at issue excluded those categories
of illegitimate children unnecessarily and was thus "constitutionally
flawed. 1 72 Therefore, the current statutes do not need to be amended to
allow children to inherit from any individual in a relationship with her
parent, but only to allow the particular parent-child relationships
discussed here to fall under the intestacy structure.

traditional definitions of marriage, but citing to social scientists who have noted various social
changes that have urged reconsideration of traditional definitions of family). See also Debra
Carrasquillo Hedges, Note, The Forgotten Children: Same-Sex Partners, Their Children and
Unequal Treatment, 41 B.C. L. REV. 883, 906 (2000).
169.

Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771.

170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id. at 772.
Id. at 771.
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States may also suggest that amending their current statutory
scheme to create rights for the children of same-sex couples implies a
social acceptance of same-sex marriage, or, at the very least, tends to
legitimize this type of relationship. By amending the statutes, children of
other non-traditional parents will also have the right to recover intestate;
the benefits will not be limited solely to children of same-sex couples. In
addition, this Note does not advocate same-sex marriage or recognition
of same-sex relationships in general; rather it approaches the issue from
the children's perspective and suggests that penalizing them for the
lifestyles of their parents is "an ineffectual-as well as an unjust-way
of deterring the parent." 173 The parents at least have the ability to
conform to societal traditions and norms, 174 "but their.., children can
affect neither their parents' conduct nor their own status." 175 Therefore,
by approaching the topic with the best interests of the child in mind,
children can enjoy their constitutional entitlements without expanding
the rights of their parents. By focusing on the nature and quality of the
relationship between the parent and the child and not the nature and
quality of the relationship between the parent and the parent's partner,
the proposal would allow the child to obtain inheritance rights without
granting the other parent any additional rights. This also mirrors the
rationale behind some equitable doctrines, since both the equitable
parent and equitable adoption theories would allow a child to inherit
from the parent, but do not in turn allow the parent to inherit from the
child or the parent to inherit from his or her partner.
Because children of same-sex parents are non-marital children by
nature, and because they are analogous to children born out-of-wedlock
for equal protection purposes, they are entitled to a heightened standard
of review using an intermediate level of scrutiny. As previously noted:
"To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory classification must be
substantially related to an important governmental objective. 1 76 The
stated governmental interests are not substantially related to legislation
that denies children the right to inherit from individuals who have been
acknowledged as their parents. Since these parents and their children
lack the biological connection required by many states, as well as the
173. Id. at 770 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 404 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
174. This is with regard to the decision to raise children. This Note does not explore or assert
whether homosexuality itself is something genetic or something the individual chooses. For one
point of view, see A. Dean Byrd & Stony Olsen, Homosexuality: Innate and Immutable?, 14
REGENT U. L. REv. 383 (2002).

175. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 770. Although, as this Note indicates, what is or is not considered a
societal norm is constantly changing. See, e.g., supra note 168 and accompanying text.
176. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
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legal adoptive connection, the statutes must be drawn in a way that still
allows the simple and smooth distribution of estates. This will prevent
the courts from being flooded with sham lawsuits and ensure that
unnecessary time and money are not expended. Since the Supreme Court
has invalidated, and will likely continue to invalidate, "classifications
that burden illegitimate children for the sake of punishing the illicit
relations of their parents,"' 17 7 these important state interests can and must
be achieved without violating the rights of the innocent children
involved.
Unlike non-marital children who can prove through genetics a
relationship with both a father and a mother, many of the children
discussed in this Note were conceived through the use of artificial
insemination or other procedures that leave them with only one
biological parent from whom they can legally inherit. This, however,
does not justify a denial of their constitutional rights; they are still
children of unwed parents entitled to inheritance from both parents,
biologically related or not. Accepting a functional or psychological
definition of a parent-child relationship is one way to prove the presence
of two parents, and this is a method that has been advocated by lawyers
and professors alike. 78 Bringing an equal protection argument on behalf
of the child 179 puts the focus where it belongs-on the child-rather than
on the parent, as occurs with the application of the alternative functional
theories. Therefore, while the parent-child relationship is by nature a
functional one rather than a biological one, the best solution is not to
invoke these common law doctrines but rather to phrase the current
inheritance statutes in a manner that will allow these parent-child
relationships to meet the requirements.
D. How Cases Like Trimble Help Children of Same-Sex Parents
As the states have adjusted their laws to meet the constitutional
needs of children born to non-marital families, so should they reexamine
their statutes to allow children raised by same-sex parents to recover
from both of their parents. In order to accomplish this, states may amend
their current intestate succession laws by substituting gender-neutral
language where needed and adding elements that, while requiring a

177.

Id.

178. See, e.g., Gary, supra note 8, at 50, 72.
179. See, e.g., Velte, supra note 160, at 304-05 ("[I]f such theories and arguments are
presented in the context of an equal protection claim for the child, the court will be faced with
competing constitutional interests and protected rights.").
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considerable amount of evidence, will be achievable by these parents
and children. Some of the language in the current statutes may be
applied, but to assure the rights of these children, additional clauses that
apply to these families should be included as well.
There are, however, difficulties with simply extending current state
laws to apply to children in the same-sex setting. Since the term "natural
father" is employed in much of the legislation,' 80 this indicates that a
child is meant to be entitled to intestate succession from his or her
biological father and mother. Some states have included inheritance for
adoptive children in these laws as well, and provide that these children
shall inherit from an adoptive parent as if the adoptive parent were a
natural parent. 181 However, by listing the inheritance rights of adopted
children in this manner, it suggests that the list is inclusive and does not
leave the door open for any of the equitable theories.
A child with two mothers or two fathers is at a disadvantage as this
fact of biology is impossible to prove in both of his or her parents. Even
where one mother has provided the genetic material for the child and the
other was the gestational mother, states may only recognize one as the
legal mother. 182 Therefore, in jurisdictions where homosexuals may not
jointly adopt a child, or where second-parent adoptions are not allowed,
there is no way to satisfy the current wording of intestate and probate
statutes. The Court in Trimble suggested that the encouragement of
legitimate families may be a sufficient state interest but "the Equal
Protection Clause requires more than the mere incantation of a proper
state purpose."' 183 In addition, most states have a legitimate, and even
important, interest in the orderly disposition of a decedent's estate and in
protecting innocent adults and those duly interested in their estates from
fraudulent claims and harassing litigation brought by supposed children
asserting themselves as heirs. 184 The problem presented with regard to
children of same-sex parents is how to broaden the requirements enough
180. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.105 (LexisNexis 1999). Other phrases used include
"birth parent" and "biological father." See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-114(a) (2004); TEX. PROB.

CODE ANN. § 42(b) (Vernon 2003).
181. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-48(1) (1991); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6450 (West Supp. 2006).
182. See K.M. v. E.G., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136, 149-50 (Ct. App. 2004), rev'd, 117 P.3d 673 (Cal.
2005). The California Court of Appeal used the intention test set forth in Johnson v. Calvert, 851

P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993), and held that E.G. as the surrogate was the intended parent, and therefore the
only parent. This ruling was reversed, but because the intention test is still likely to be used for

questions of motherhood in jurisdictions less liberal than California, the lower court's opinion
provides interesting reasoning for why the rights of a second mother who contributed her genetics
might still not be recognized.
183.
184.

Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977).
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268, 271 (1978).
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to allow them a plausible route to recovery, but still keep this avenue
limited enough so the state is not flooded with frivolous claims or forced
to employ an unreasonable amount of time and resources, and to ensure
that the allocation and administration of estates continue to run
smoothly.
IV.
A.

PROPOSAL

Where the Change Should Originate

It is clear that this issue is a serious and legitimate concern for
children of same-sex parents and this problem, therefore, needs to be
addressed. While it is not as certain where the change should begin,
there are only two real options: the courts and the legislatures.
The courts provide an avenue where new issues in public policy can
be addressed in order to better meet the needs of a changing society.
Thus, courts can create new judge-made law that has the ability to
influence and persuade sister jurisdictions to do the same. Courts protect
constitutional rights and declare statutes unconstitutional if necessary.
Because there is not a lot of law in this area, there is not much binding
precedent and judges have the ability to interpret statutes broadly so as
to allow same-sex parents and their children to recover under the current
inheritance statutes.
But, the courts were not meant to be the rule-makers. They were
designed to enforce the law, not write it. And, while the lack of binding
precedent can be seen as a boon to children of same-sex parents seeking
to adjudicate their rights, this same absence of law gives judges the
discretion to interpret statutes narrowly and thus limit rights instead of
granting new ones. Moreover, favorable decisions are always at risk of
being overruled. Furthermore, litigation is expensive, time-consuming
and uncertain. And, since each case is decided on its own facts, while the
courts may provide an acceptable method for those individuals who can
afford it, litigation provides no assurance of protection for other families
in similar situations.
Addressing this problem in the legislature allows individual states
to have a say in what the requirements should be and what it should take
to prove there is a parent-child relationship worthy of recognition. In this
way, the states may differ on the level of proof they require for an
individual to qualify under intestate succession, but the courts within the
state will not be able to interpret a statute too broadly so long as the
wording is clear and unambiguous. This also provides for a uniform
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application of the laws within states by eliminating the possibility of
conflicting decisions among lower courts.
The legislative approach has its flaws, of course. First, there are
many states that will be hesitant to expand any statute that would
legalize and grant rights to any relationship between homosexuals, even
for the narrow and limited purpose of children's inheritance rights.'8 5
Second, it is not easy to amend a statutory scheme. The process is a long
one and in the meantime there may be other developments in society or
the legal world that should then be considered, which again would lead
the states to be cautious about making these changes.
While both approaches have pros and cons, seeking change in the
legislature is the better answer. The legislative method provides clearer
standards that would not likely be overruled by subsequent court
decisions, unless, of course, the statute is held unconstitutional. It also
offers more defined guidelines, providing the courts with plain rules to
follow. However, if the states refuse to take the initiative and pass new
laws or amend their current inheritance statutes, then the courts must
take action and hold the current statutes unconstitutional, since they
violate children's equal protection rights.
B. Proposalfor the Legislature
This Note suggests that the constitutional rights of children require
the states to take action and draft legislation that allows a child of samesex parents to inherit from the parent who has not been deemed "legal."
The states must simply re-evaluate their current laws and make minor
changes in the language in order to incorporate the children at issue. The
elements in the statute may be achievable by proof of a parent-child
relationship, or the states can alter the words in their current statute so
they do not apply only to one gender and so that a biological relationship
is not an absolute requirement.
Constitutional recognition of these children's rights is both
necessary and in order. States should therefore take action to keep their
inheritance laws from being declared unconstitutional. In order to meet
the needs of children, as well as the constitutional requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the states must implement a set of elements, as
stringent or flexible as the individual state deems necessary. These
elements then must be met in order to establish a parent-child
relationship. Since the Supreme Court has suggested that punishing
185. For example, most states that have enacted their own versions of DOMA will likely be
reluctant to grant children of same-sex couples any rights.
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children as a way of deterring their parents is an "ineffectual" and
"unjust way of deterring the parent,"' 8 6 this reasoning easily extends to
the children presented here.
This proposal urges the states to both examine the current language
in their inheritance statutes and make only those changes necessary to
protect the rights of children of same-sex parents.' 87 This merely
requires that proof of a genetic connection be optional, not mandatory,
and that the statutory language not be limited to mother and father. In
other words, where the statute lists ways in which a non-marital child
can inherit from his or her father, the word "father" must be changed to
allow for another parent of the same sex. By simply changing some of
the wording in the statutes already in effect, states can assure that these
children will receive their constitutional right of equal protection and
their entitlement to inherit intestate from both of their parents.
This proposal would make the level of proof attainable without a
blood test to prove paternity, but nevertheless would still require a high
level of circumstantial proof to discourage frivolous and arbitrary
litigation. For example, a written acknowledgment of a parent-child
relationship, signed by a notary, 188 is a condition that these parents and
children can meet. In addition, some states allow for a child to receive
the last name of one partner on a birth certificate even when the other
parent provided the genetic material. For example, in California, a male
partner can be named as the mother and a female can be named as the
father on the birth certificate.' 89 In states where these practices are
allowed, they could be sufficient to guarantee recognition of both
parents, and a child in this situation would be able to inherit from either
estate. These examples represent some suggestions a state can
incorporate, but they by no means imply the minimum or maximum
level of proof required. The states can therefore allow a functional
parent-child relationship to receive recognition under the law, but can do
so by choosing the specific requirements necessary to prove entitlement
to recovery.
Because all of the current state statutes have components that can
be met by the parent-child relationships discussed here, the changes need
186. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
187. For specific examples of how these changes can be incorporated, see Appendix, infra.
188. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(2)(B)(i) (Consol. 2006).
189. Davis v. Kania, 836 A.2d 480, 481, 484 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003) (finding one partner
equitably estopped from attacking a California trial court's judgment, which allowed one of two
male partners to be listed as mother where the two men established a parental relationship with a
child while residing in California); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814(A)(3) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2006) (allowing birth certificate as evidence of paternity).
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not be drastic. Instead the word "and" need only be replaced with "or,"
terms must be made gender neutral, or the meaning behind certain
phrases needs to be extended so as to allow recovery by these children.
This will allow children of same-sex parents to inherit, but the
qualifications adopted are ones that have already proven successful in
terms of inheritance.
In addition to the examples discussed above, some of the common
phrases in inheritance statutes will be sufficient to meet the
constitutional needs of children of same-sex parents. Statutory language
that can be employed requires the simple replacement of the word
"father" with the word "parent," and examples include: the parent
openly and notoriously acknowledged or claimed or treated the child as
his or her own and there is a presentation of clear and convincing
evidence to support such a statement, 19° the parent signed a written
acknowledgment of parenthood,' 9' "the... parents participated in a
marriage ceremony before or after the birth of the child, even though the
attempted marriage is void,"' 192 or there193was a court order declaring said
individual to be the parent of the child.
The parent who is not biologically or legally related to the child can
easily prove that he or she openly and notoriously acknowledged the
child as his or her own, through evidence of notes, cards and paper
documents as well as by providing for the child financially, or through
testimony of members of the community. The same parent can also
present a written acknowledgment that he or she is in fact the parent of
the subject child. In addition, plenty of same-sex couples take part in
marriage ceremonies,' 94 and while there is, in nearly all states, no legally
190. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208(b)(3) (LexisNexis 2001); 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2107(c)(2) (West 2005); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-3 (1997) (discussing
other clear and convincing evidence).
191.

See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-209 (2004); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.

§ 700.2114(b)(i)

(West 2002 & Supp. 2006) (using the term advocated by this Note:
"acknowledgment of parentage").
192. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.105(1)(a) (LexisNexis 1999); see also NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-2309(2)(i) (LexisNexis 2001).
193. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 215 (West 1990); see also WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 852.05(l)(a)-(b) (West 2002) (using two phrases, "father has been adjudicated to be the father"
and "has admitted in open court that he is the father").
194. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 543 (N.J. 2000); see also State v. Mallan, 950
P.2d 178, 245 (Haw. 1998) (Levinson, J., dissenting) ("Increasing numbers of [gay and lesbian
couples surveyed] are celebrating their relationships in ceremonies of commitment. Those who
participate commonly refer to the ceremonies as weddings and to themselves as married, even
though they know that the ceremonies are not legally recognized..." (quoting David L.
Chambers, Essay, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian
and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 449 (1996))).
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recognized marriage formed, the ceremony should be enough to evince
intent to be married, and to raise any children as children of this
marriage. Finally, in cases where one parent has taken the other to court
for visitation, custody or support issues, such orders should serve as
evidence of a parent-child relationship for inheritance purposes as well.
Another proposal is embodied in the Uniform Parentage Act, which
"allows voluntary acknowledgement of paternity" and "specifies a
procedure for such acknowledgement."1' 95 While the Uniform Parentage
Act focuses again on the functional nature of the parent-child
relationship, 196 it contains suggestions for the legislatures on different
sets of wording that would allow same-sex parents and their children to
meet the definition of parent and child. Since this Note suggests that a
voluntary acknowledgment of parenthood could be one of the elements
in the amended statutes, it is this Note's position that the Uniform
Parentage Act provides good guidelines for the states197to consider in
determining what would qualify as an acknowledgment.
Of course, many states may be hesitant to include gender-neutral
language in their statutes or to expand the established requirements to
make it possible for more people to recover under intestate succession,
in the fear that it will open the doors to rights for homosexuals that they
are not ready or willing to grant. This logic follows a "floodgate
theory"198-- expanding legislation and allowing this type of nontraditional parent-child relationship recovery opens the door to other
claims by children alleging a legitimate and recognizable relationship
with a decedent, until the lines are so blurred that anyone and everyone
can recover. The floodgate theory also extends to expanding the type of
relationships that are recognized. This refers to the fear that the
recognition of children of same-sex parents would lead to recognition of
the parents' relationship as well. However, the only legislation at issue
195. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 163, at 127; see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 201, 204,
301, 302, 9B U.L.A. 309, 311-14 (2001 & Supp. 2006).
196. The Act also creates a presumption of paternity that could be changed to a presumption of
parentage and adapted to allow de facto parents to qualify as presumptive parents. Id. § 204, 9B
U.L.A. at 311. See Jennifer L. Rosato, Children of Same-Sex ParentsDeserve the Security Blanket
of the ParentagePresumption, 44 FAM. CT. REv. 74, 81 (2006) (discussing presumed parenthood
for children of same-sex parents and the Uniform Parentage Act).
197. The Uniform Parentage Act suggests that an acknowledgment of paternity must be in a
record; must "be signed or otherwise authenticated"; and must "state that the signatories understand
that the acknowledgment is the equivalent of a judicial adjudication of paternity." UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 302, 9B U.L.A.at 314.
198. Professor Andrew Schepard, Director of the Center for Children, Families and the Law,
and Professor of Law at Hofstra Law School, suggested the use of the phrase "floodgate theory" in
this context.
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here is that which deals with the rights of children. Replacing "father"
with "parent" and removing "natural" where it is not deemed entirely
necessary in only those statutes that refer to the children's inheritance
rights will preserve for these children the rights to which they are
entitled without expanding the rights of their parents.
States that are willing to fully re-examine their current inheritance
laws are encouraged to incorporate aspects of the equitable theories in
their legislative schemes to protect both the best interests and the
constitutional rights of the children involved. While these doctrines are
not perfect and have been interpreted differently by various courts, they
provide some options to the legislature as to how to fashion the
requirements of proof. The states, by including portions of these theories
in their legislation, can also limit the theories to address only the
inheritance issues for the children involved, while leaving the common
law doctrines themselves intact as options for custody, support and
visitation battles for both homosexual and heterosexual parents alike.
V.

CONCLUSION

Children raised by parents of the same sex are entitled to the same
inheritance rights to which children raised by heterosexual parents are
entitled. But because these children lack the two bloodlines from which
most children inherit, they cannot prove parental relationships with
science and genetics. If there has also been no formal adoption due to
illegality or neglect by the parents, the states need to find alternative
ways for these children to receive the rights to which they are entitled.
Because intestacy laws are designed to reflect the intention of the
decedent, a homosexual parent who has loved, reared and supported a
child since the child's conception or arrival into the family would
presumably intend such a child to recover from his or her estate.
Therefore, the states need to adapt to this changing reality by fashioning
elements of proof that same-sex parents and their children can meet.
Allowing states to draft their own legislation guided by a broad set of
possibilities leaves the power in each individual state-where it
belongs-to determine the best and most efficient way to administer
distribution of estates while protecting the constitutional rights of the
children involved.
Children of same-sex parents are analogous to children born out-ofwedlock for equal protection purposes, and under an intermediate
scrutiny standard of review, most current statutes are unconstitutional.
The statutes do not allow children of same-sex parents to recover from
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the estate of a parent who has not been established as a legal parent, and
this leaves such children at an unfair disadvantage in terms of both
financial and emotional support. Therefore, while the legislature
provides the most efficient and effective method of addressing the needs
of these children and adapting to the changes in society, if the states
refuse to take action, then the courts must intervene and declare
unconstitutional the existing statutes.
Children have no control over the way they are raised, or who
raises them. To punish them because society may disapprove of the
choices their parents have made is both ineffective and unjust.
Accordingly, to meet the constitutional needs of these children, their
rights to inheritance must be both recognized and remedied. Children of
same-sex parents are entitled to the same recovery from both parents as
children of opposite-sex parents. Therefore, children of same-sex parents
should receive inheritance rights from both parents, legally recognized
or otherwise.
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APPENDIX
This section provides two current state statutes and suggests
changes in wording that would allow children of same-sex parents to
inherit. It is included to clarify some of the suggestions made in Part IV
and throughout this Note.
A.
1.

EXAMPLE I

CurrentStatute: Florida9 9

732.108. Adopted persons and persons born out of wedlock

(2) For the purpose of intestate succession in cases not covered by
subsection (1),20 a person born out of wedlock is a lineal
descendent of his or her mother and is one of the natural kindred
of all members of the mother's family. The person is also a lineal
descendent of his or her father and is one of the natural kindred of
all members of the father's family, if:
(a) The natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony before
or after the birth of the person born out of wedlock, even though
the attempted marriage is void.
(b) The paternity of the father is established by an adjudication
before or after the death of the father.
(c) The paternity of the father is acknowledged in writing by the
father.

199. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.108 (West 2005). Florida may seem to be an unlikely choice as a
model statute, since it is the one state that explicitly prohibits homosexuals from adopting. It would
seem to follow that the legislature would be more than a little hesitant to adapt its intestacy laws to
afford children of homosexuals any protection. However, it was selected because it contains a few
of the phrases this author would encourage the states to use (after changing the words to be gender
neutral) and to illustrate that the changes proposed can be applied to all states.
200. Section 732.108(1) concerns adopted individuals. Id.
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1

(2) For the purpose of intestate succession in cases not covered by
subsection (1), a person born out of wedlock is a lineal descendent
of his or her mother or biologicalfather and is one of the natural
kindred of all members of the-mothers this parent's family. The
person is also a lineal descendent of his or her fiAhe other parent
and is one of the natural kindred of all members of the-father's his
or her family, if:
(a) The natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony before
or after the birth of the person born out of wedlock, even though
the attempted marriage is void.
(b) The pat ity of the father Parenthood is established by an
adjudication before or after the death of the-fathe saidparent.
(c) The paterity of the falther Parenthood is acknowledged in
writing by the-fahe saidparent.
B.
1.

EXAMPLE 2202
20 3

Current Statute: Pennsylvania

§ 2107 Persons born out of wedlock

(c) Child of father-For purposes of descent by, from and through a
person born out of wedlock, he shall be considered the child of his
father when the identity of the father has been determined in any
one of the following ways:
(1) If the parents of a child born out of wedlock shall have married
each other.
201. Deletions from the original statute are noted with strikethrough, while insertions are noted
in italics.
202. Two examples are provided simply because three phrases are especially important to
emphasize: (1) the idea of an acknowledgment in writing requirement contained in the Florida
statute; (2) the participation in a marriage ceremony even if such marriage is void, also contained in
the Florida statute; and (3) openly holding the child out to be his or hers and providing support for
the child, embodied in the Pennsylvania statute.
203. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2107 (West 2005).
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(2) If during the lifetime of the child, the father openly holds out the
child to be his and receives the child into his home, or openly
holds the child out to be his and provides support for the child
which shall be determined by clear and convincing evidence.
(3) If there is clear and convincing evidence that the man was the
father of the child, which may include a prior court
determination of paternity.
2. Model Statute B

(c) Child of fathe other parent-Forpurposes of descent by, from
and through a person born out of wedlock, he or she shall be
considered the child of his--fathe this parent when the identity of
the father this parent has been determined in any one of the
following ways:
(1) If the parents of a child born out of wedlock shall have mafried
eaeh-ehefr-participatedin a marriageor commitment ceremony,
even if such marriageis void.
(2) If during the lifetime of the child, the-fathef this parent openly
holds out the child to be his or hers and receives the child into
his or her home, or openly holds the child out to be his or hers
and provides support for the child which shall be determined by
clear and convincing evidence.
(3) If there is clear and convincing evidence that the man person
was the fathef parent of the child, which may include a prior
court determination of patem.ity ofparenthood.
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